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From The Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin

Weintra~b*

and Alan N. Resnick**

A TRUSTEE'S POWER TO
COMPEL A SECURED CREDITOR
TO PURSUE REMEDIES AGAINST
A GUARANTOR: MARSHALING OF
ASSETS REVISITED AGAIN

ln 1985, we criticized the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in In re Jack Green's
Fashions for Men-Big & Tall, Inc. 1
as a misapplication of the equitable
doctrine of marshaling to compel a
secured creditor to pursue remedies
against a g\larantor so as to maximize the distribution to unsecured
creditors of the corporate debtor. 2
Ih that case, the court of appeals
upheld the trustee's use of the socalled strong-arm provision, which
gives the trustee the rights and powers of a hypothetical judicial lien
* Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1
597 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1979).
2
See Weintraub & Resnick, "Compelling a Senior Lienor to Pursue Remedies
Against a Guarantor-A Misapplication of
the Marshaling Doctrine," 18 U.C.C.L.J.
178 (1985).

creditor, to justify such use of the
marshaling doctrine. 3
Our primary criticism of the decision in Jack Green's Fashions was
that the court ignored the significant
''common debtor'' requirement for
marshaling assets; the doctrine is
applicable only when a senior lienor
h~s a lien on two or more properties
or funds of the same debtor while
the junior lienor has a lien on only
one of those properties or funds.
The doctrine is not applicable where
the properties subject to the liens
are owned by two separate debtors,
such as a corporate debtor and a
guarantor. Another criticism of the
decision was that it did not give
due regard to the requirement that
marshaling not prejudice the senior
lienor by causing delay or increased
expense.
Although we expressed in our article the view that the strong-arm
power under Section 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code was not intended,
and shQuld not be interpreted, to
give the trustee the power to compel
marshaling of assets at all, we also
concluded that:
Except in rare cases where fraud or
other inequitable conduct justifies
3
See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a), derived from
§ 70(c) of the former Bankruptcy Act. The

court in Jack Green's Fashions focused on
§ 70(c) of the Act.
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piercing the corporate veil so as to
treat a corporate debtor and a shareholder guarantor as the same entity,
the marshaling doctrine should not
be used to compel a secured creditor
to pursue remedies against a guarantor's assets. Application of the marshaling doctrine to compel foreclosure on a guarantor's property
violates the common debtor requirement and imposes on the senior lienor
additional expenses and undue delay
in obtaining payment. 4

In the seven years since our article on Jack Green's Fashions, other
courts have recognized the trustee's
ability to use Section 544(a) to compel marshaling of assets. In 1986,
we wrote again on this subject, 5
but that time applauding the Tampa
Chain6 decision of the bankruptcy
court in the southern district of New
York which, although relying on
the trustee's powers under Section
544(a) to give the trustee standing
to seek marshaling of assets against
a guarantor, limited the marshaling
doctrine to situations where inequitable conduct justifies piercing the
corporate veil of the debtor and the
equitable subordination of the guarantor's subrogation claim against
the debtor.
We again revisit the subject of
marshaling of assets to report on an
interesting district court decision,
4

18 U.C.C. L.J. at 181-182.
See Weintraub & Resnick, "Subordination of the Guarantor's Subrogation
Rights-The Marshaling Doctrine Revisited," 18 U.C.C. L.J. 364 (1986).
6 53 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
5
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In re Vermont Toy Works, Inc. ,7
that illustrates further limitations,
including important procedural requirements, regarding the use of
the marshaling doctrine to compel a
secured creditor to exhaust its remedies against a guarantor.
Vermont Toy Works 8
The debtor, Vermont Toy Works,
Inc., is a Vermont corporation that
was engaged in the numufacturing
of fmished wood products. The officers a9d directors were a family
consisting of David Winer, his wife
Janet, and his son Gordon. David
Winer was the sole shareholder of
the corporation. In November 1984,
the debtor corporation borrowed
from Chittenden Trust Company the
sum of $150,000. The loan was
secured by a security interest in the
debtor's assets and the personal
guarantees of David and Janet Winer. Additionally, David and Janet
Winer exec'!ted an agreement that
authorized the debtor to pledge as
additional collateral $125,000
worth of securities owned by David
and Janet Winer. In April 1985,
Chittenden subordinated $50,000 of
its security interest in the debtor's
machinery and equipment to Vermont Industrial Development Au7

135 Bankr. 762 (D. Vt. 1991).
For a detailed description of the facts
in the case, see the seventy-six-page bankruptcy court decision at 82 Bankr. 258
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1987). "The opinion of the
bankruptcy court set forth in detail the facts
of the case; familiarity with that. opinion is
assumed, and only an abbreviated version
of the facts relevant to this appeal is stated
below." 135 Bankr. at 765.
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thority, which had loaned the debtor
$49,300 as a secured loan.
Chittenden also extended personal loans of $493,500 to David and
Janet Winer. These personal loans
were secured by mortgages on real
estate and a pledge of the same securities that secured the corporate
loans. The proceeds of the personal
loans were invested in the debtor
corporation to provide working capital. By mid-November 1985, the
corporate debtor defaulted on its
loan obligations to Chittenden, and
the following month Chittenden and
the Vermont Industrial Development Authority took possession of
the corporate debtor's collateral
consisting of machinery and equipment. The corporation waived its
rights to redeem the collateral.
Only three days after the debtor's
machinery and equipment were taken into possession, C.hittenden and
Vermont Wood Industries, Inc.,
then a six-week old corporation in
which David Winer was president
and tt;easurer, chairman of the
board, and a 50 percent shareholder, 9 entered into an agreement
whereby Chittenden leased the debtor's machinery and equipment to
Vermont Wood. The lease agreement also contained an option for
Vermont Wood to purchase the machinery and equipment for an
amount equal to the outstanding de9

Id. at 766 n. 1. Vermont Wood's other

50 percent shareholder, Arthur Jacobson,
provided the financial investment necessary
to fund the corporation and had the power
to name two of Vermont Wood's three directors.

clining principal balance on the corporate debtor's loan.
Involuntary Petition
Several 'weeks later, unsecured
creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against the corporate
debtor to attempt to prevent the sale
of the machinery and equipment to
Vermont Wood. Sebert Lumber
Co., one of the petitioning creditors, simultaneously moved for an
order prohibiting ~ debtor from
selling the machinery and equiplllent. The bankruptcy court denied
Sebert's motion based on Section
303(t) of the Code, 10 which permits
a debtor to continue its business
during the time betw,~ the filing
of an involuntary petition and entry
of an order for relief. The court also
referred to the possibility that Sebert
could obtain relief at some later tim~
under the Code provisions relating
to the automatic stay and voidable
preferences. 11
Concerned that the bankruptcy
court's reference to the automatic
stay and preference provisions of
the Code was ''placing a cloud'' on
its title to the repossessed machinery
and equipment, Chittenden filed a
motion entitled ''Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Or Motion For
Relief From Automatic Stay.'' 12
The bankruptcy court ordered that
the machinery and equipment be
sold by Chittenden, as agent for the
11 u.s.c. § 303(f).
The bankruptcy court cited 11 U.S. C.
§§ 362(a)(6), 547.
12
135 Bankr. at 766.
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trustee, to Vermont Wood pursuant
to the prepetition contract and that
Chittenden's security interest attach
to the proceeds, but also ordered
iliftt the proceeds be held in an interest-bearing account pending the outcome of the hearing on the motion.
The Doctrine of Marshaling of
Assets
At the hearing, Sebert was permitted by the court to argue, on
behalf of the trustee·, 13 that the'doctrine of marshaling was applicable
to compel Cl1ittenden to pursue its
remedies against the Winers as
guarantors, thus leaving the proceeds of the machinery and equipment for distribution to unsecured
creditors.· In the words of the district
court:
The doctrine of marshaling of assets
is an equitable.principle designed to
benefit junior secured creditors. It
is traditionally applied when two or
more secured creditors claim against
one debtor and a senior creditor can
reach'two properties or funds held by
the debtor, whereas, a junior creditor
can reach only one. Marshaling requires that the senior creditor first
satisfy. its claims from the property
or fund in which the junior creditor
has no interest. . . . :rhe marshaling
13 "The bankruptcy court held that absent any specific lif\litati6n in the bankruptcy
code, Sebert's attorney could present the
marshaling defense on behalf of the trustee
with the trustee's consent and the court's
approval. For the purpose of this opinion, it
will be assumed that the trustee may hire
the unsecured creditor's attorney as special
counsel to prosecute the lawsuit." 135
Bankr. at 766, n.3.
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doctrine is designed to prevent the
senior lienor from arbitrarily depriving the junior lienor of his security. 14

There are three elements that
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence before the marshaling doctrine may be employed:
(1) the existence of two secured creditors with a common debtor, (2) the
existence of two funds belonging to
th~ debtor, and (3) the right of the
senior creditor to satisfy its demand
from more than one fund, while the
other creditor may resort to only one
fund .15 •

.

In addition, marshaling may not
be invoked where it will cause prejudice to the senior creditor or to
other parties. 16
Bankruptcy Court's Decision
The banKruptcy court ordered the
debtor's repossessed collateral marshaled. Chittenden was directed to
seek relief from the automatic stay
to satisfy its loans to the debtor
corporation by enforcing the personal guarantees of David and Gordon Winer. To the extent the loans
were not satisfied from the guarantors, the bankruptcy couri indicated
that Chittenden could seek relief
from the automatic stay to liquidate
the pledged securities. To satisfy
the "common debtor" and the "two
fund" elements of'marshaling, the
bankruptcy court merged the assets
of David Winer and the corporate

380
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135 Bankr. at 767.

u

Id.

16

See/d.
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debtor by piercing the corporate veil
based on David Winer's inequitable
condpct. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined t,hat the
corporate debtor -possessed three
funds from which Chittenden could
satisfy its loans: the repossessed machinery and equipment, the personal
guarantt<es, and the pledged seOJrities.
The court also found that marshaling assets would not prejudice
Chittenden at all· because David
Winer had sufficient assets td satisfy
both the personal and corporate obligations o~ed to Chittenden. Finally, the bankruptcy court equitably
subordinated David Winer's guarantee relationship in order to prevent him from becoming subrogated
to Chittenden's secured status after
Chittenden satisfies its debts from
David Winer's personal· guarantee
or hypothecated securitieS<.
Issues on Appeal
On appeal, 17 the district court li~t
ed four issues that required resolution:
(1) Is the trustee entitled to bring a
marshaling of assets action?
(2) Can the marshaling doctrine be
applied without David, Janet, and
9ordon Winer being partjes to the
action?
(3) Do the facts presented support a
decision to pierce the corporate veil
and impose personal liability?
17
In addition to the brief filed by Chittenden, the Vermont Bankers' Association flled
an amicus curiae brief urging reversal of the
bankruptcy court decision.

(4) Can the marshaling doctrine be
applied in this instance without cau.sing prejudice to the senior lienholder
or third parties? 18

Regarding the first issue, the
bankruptcy and district courts, recognizing a split of authority, agreed
with those courts that have recognized the trustee's right to seek marshaling of assets. 19 They reasoned
that Section 544(a) grants the trustee
the rights affor~ed a hypothetical
lien creditor under the applicable
state law, that the trustee is considered a secured creditor under Vermont law, and that a secured creditor ,has the authority to brip.g a
marshaling action. 20 The district
court rejected· Chittenden's argument that the bankruptcy court's
holding ''confuses the status of the
trustee with those he rep,resents: the
traditional requiremt?nt is not t)lat
marshaling be invoked by a secured
creditor, but that it be invoked for a
secured creditor.' ' 21
18
135 Bankr. at 767. "This court assumes for the purposes of this opinion that
debtor retained an interest in the collateral
as of the commencement of the bankruptcy
case, which became property of the estate
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Moreover, it will be assumed that this interest was
sufficient to grant the estate the authority to
invoke the marshaling doctrine with respect
to the collateral." ld., n. 4.
19
The bankruptcy court specifically followed the reasoning in In re Tampa Chain
Co., 53 Bankr. 772 (B;lnkr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
'
•
20
The district court relied on Section 9301(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code to
show that a judicial lien creditor is considered a secured creditor under Vermont law.
21
135 Bankr. at 768.
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Failure to Commence an
Adversary Proceeding Joining the
Guarantors as Parties
Turning to the second issue, the
district court noted that David, Janet, and Gordon Winer were not
parties to the proceeding in which
the bankruptcy court ordered the
marshaling of assets by directing
Chittenden to satisfy its loans from
the Winers based on their guarantees and from the Winers' securities
held as collateral. ''In a)llarshaling
action, entities holding the funds to
which only a senior creditor can
look must be joined as parties .... In
addition, the Vermont substantive
law of marshaling would require
that either the parties in interest be
before the court or 'at the very least,
that the fund should be before the
court so that the judgment might
operate in rem.' '' 22
Chittenden should have instituted
an adversary proceeding joining the
Winers as parties" and framing the
issues properly in the pleading.
Such an adversary proceeding
would also allow other creditors of
the Wihers to intervene to protect
their interests. ''This is an adversary proceeding between Chittend~n and Sebert requesting declaratory relief. Sebert's pleadings do
not mention the marshaling doctrine
or piercing the corporate veil. This
extraordinary application of the
marshaling doctrine was not foreseeable to the Winers or their creditors. " 23
22
23
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The district court also criticized
the bankruptcy court for not requiring proper procedures when equitably subordinating David Winer's
claim against the corporate debtor
in order to prevent him from using
subrogation rights to step into Chittenden's secured status after Chittenden satisfies its debts from David
Winer's personal assets. "A claim
of equitable subordination based on
11 U.S.C. § 510(c)mustbebrought
in an adverary proceeding. " 24
Finally, the district court held that
an adversary proceeding should
have been brought against David
Winer in order to pierce the corporate veil. In order to satisfy the
elements of the marshaling doctrine, the bankruptcy court had
merged the assets of David Winer
and the corporate debtor by disregarding the corporate entity and
piercing the corporate veil. "Admittedly, this veil piercing action
does not substantively consolidate
David Winer's estate with Debtor's
estate but requires him to satisfy
his personal guarantee of Debtor's
\oans. However, in the context of
this marshaling action, piercing the
corporate veil will cost David Winer
approximately $150,000 without
the benefit of the procedural protection afforded by an adversary proceeding. " 25
Piercing the Corporate Veil
In a footnote, the district court
pointed out an irony in the case.

ld.
135 Bankr. at 769.

24[d.
25
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''The irony is that if David Winer
were a proper party to this action,
and the trustee were able to prove
sufficient inequitable conduct to
pierce the corporate veil, there
would be no need to apply the marshaling doctrine to achieve the trustee's objective.... Once the veil was
pierced and David Winer's assets
were merged with the assets of the
corporate debtor, unsecured creditors would have access to his personal assets. " 26
Nonetheless, the district court did
focus on the merits of the bankruptcy court's decision to pierce the
corporate veil. After careful review, the district court held that
the bankruptcy court's decision to
pierce the corporate veil under. the
facts of the case had to be se~ aside
as clearly erroneous.
Courts ge~rally list as reasons for
piercing the corporate veil the following: using the corporation to perpetrate a fraud; the personal use of
corporate funds; the failure 'to observe corporate formalities; and undercapitalization. . . . Although the
bankruptcy court cited the relevant
factors, the evidence is insufficient
to support this remedy. The record
is devoid of any evidence of fraud or
the personal use of corporate funds.
For the most part, Debtor observed
26
Id., n.5. The court cited In re Dealer
Support Servs. Int'l., Inc., 73 Bankr. 763,
765 n.3. (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re
Luby, 89 Bankr. 120, 127-128 (Bankr. D.
Ore. 1988) (once corporate veil is pierced
the third element of marshaling-that only
senior creditor has a right to both funds-is
no longer met because junior creditor would
have access to both funds).

corporate formalities .. Debtor's finances were kept separate and apart
from David Winer's finances. 27

The bankruptcy court's reliance
on the debtor's alleged undercapitalization was also found to be erroneous. "There is no reason to
conclude that Debtor was undercapitalized simply because it failed ....
The adequacy of capital is measured
as of the time of formation of the
corporation. . . . It cannot be said,
based on the nature of the business
and the size of the corporate undertaking, that $10,000 was inadequate
capital. '' 28 The district court also
found that, even if the debtor was
undercapitalized, that is not a persuasive reason for disregarding the
corporate entity ·in this case which
involves contract creditors~ ''Undercapitalization alone is not a sufficient ground for disregarding the
corporate entity. . . . [B]usinesses
that choose to deal with corpora..
tions on a credit basis should protect
themselves by doing their own investigation of the corporation's financial condition.' ' 29
Other Factors Rejected

The district. court also rejected
four other factors enunciated by the
bankruptcy court in support of its
decision to pierce the corporate veil:
27
137 Bankr. at 770. The court commented that certain corporate formalities,
such as directors' meetings, "are nonsensical when applied to small privately-held
corporations and should be given little, if
any, weight in a veil piercing action.''
28
135 Bankr. at 771.
29 ld.
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(1) an alleged preferential transfer
by the debtor to David Winer in
the amount of between $5,000 and
$20,000 in repayment of personal
loans; (2) a certain settlement agreement that provided David Winer
with a secured demand note of the
debtor· for $48,000 in payment of
unpaid r,ent; (3) sale by the debtor
of a corp~rate asset to David Winer;
and (4) Chittenden's foreclosure on
its security interest in the-debtor's
collateral, which the bankruptcy
court viewed as an attempt by David
Winer to imprope.rly release his
assets that guaranteed the corporate
loan.
The district court, reviewing the
events re,garding the debtor's financial problems and leading to the
filing of the involuntary petition,
also rejected tile bankruptcy court's
finding that Chittenden and David
Winer wrongfully conspired to create the demise of the debtor and to
steer a valuable corporate opportunity to a new corporation, Vermont
Woods. By the fall t>f 1985, the
debtor was no longer able to continue operations without the help of
outside investors. It did not have
working capital to purchase materials and several large customers had
refused to pay their bills. In addition, the new corporation was financed by Arthur Jacobson, Vermont Woods' other 50 percent
shareholder. "Subsequently, Debtor and Chittenden engaged in a loan
workout plan by liquidating the collateral and minimizing the deficiency. The workout plan had the same
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effect upon unsecured creditors as
the [C]hapter ?liquidation, because
Chittenden had a perfected security
interest in the collateral. " 30
Prejudice to Chittenden
Finally, the district court found
that marshaling of assets was not
available in this case in any event
because Chittenden, as .senior secured creditor, would be prejudiced
by having to proceed against the
Winers on a personal guarantee instead of resorting to liquid collateral
held in escrow. Moreover, by exhausting $150,000 of personal
assets of the Winers to obtain payment of the corporate debt, marshaling would reduce the likelihood that
Chittenden would·be able to collect
on its personal loans given to David
Winer. Although the bankruptcy
court concluded that David Winer
had sufficient assets to pay all corporate and personal obligations
owed to Chittenden, the diS~rict
court noted that Chittenden ''argues
persuasively'' that Winer had insufficient assets to pay all of his loans. 31
Eor all the reasons discussed
above, the district court reversed the
marshaling order of the bankruptcy
court and remanded the case for
further proceedings in accordance
with its opinion.
30

135 Bankr. at 773.

31

Id., n.ll. Again criticizing the proce-

dural aspects of the proceeding, the district
court commented that "[a]n adversary proceeding would certainly assist in the proper
determination of this question. See Vermont
Toy, 82 Bankr. at 283- (bankruptcy court
forced to 'assume' there are no mortgages
on David Winer's home)." ld.
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dividual guarantors. The decision
Conclusion
also
emphasizes the importance of
The district court opinion in Verfollowing
appropriate procedures
mont Toys serves to remind us of
when
attempting
to use the marshalhow difficult it is for a bankruptcy
ing
doctrine.
One
of the bankruptcy
trustee to successfully use the
court's
fundamental
errors was in
strong-arm powers under Section
allowing
this
type
of
proceeding to
544(a) and the marshaling doctrine
to compel a secured creditor to ex- continue as a motion without all
haust its remedies again~t a guaran- appropriate yarties being joined, intor befote prdceeding against the cl!lding the> guarantors. Clearly, an
debtor's collateral. In any event, it adversary proceeding against the
should
is unquestionably beyond the scope guarantors and Chittenden
32
have
been
required.
of the marshaling doctrine to force
a secured creditor with an interest , . 32- - - - in a sufficient amount of segregated
See Part VII of the Federal Rules of
_1
Ba~ptcy Procedure on adversary pro•
cash co11ater<U to instead pursue in- ceedmgs.
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